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Errors are ours. 1 Introduction
In this study, we model the marriage-market mechanisms through which men and women
match according to physical attractiveness and socioeconomic characteristics. Speci￿cally,
we examine how people sort in terms of body size and height on one hand, and wages and
earnings on the other, to investigate the spousal trade-o⁄s among these attributes that men
and women face in the marriage market.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the relative importance in the marriage market
of anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics, and the extent to which men assess
these characteristics di⁄erently from the way women do. Are marriage market forces allowing
individuals to sort along both types of characteristics? Most importantly, is the marriage
market allowing for individuals to compensate for their negative physical characteristics with
their own positive socioeconomic characteristics and vice versa? Whether this compensation
takes place at equilibrium depends on the determinants of the marriage market, but most
of all on whether individuals are potentially willing and able to substitute their defects with
their qualities, and on whether their mates are willing to accept this compensation across
characteristics, i.e. whether they see them as actual substitutes. Our contribution is to model
and estimate mate preferences along these dimensions and to theoretically and empirically
show that they can generate equilibrium sorting and compensation in marriage.
We construct a matching model on the marriage market along more than one characteristic,
where individuals have preferences over physical attractiveness (proxied by anthropometric
characteristics) and market and household productivity of potential mates (proxied by socioe-
conomic characteristics), with a certain degree of substitutability between them. A crucial
ingredient of our approach is that although each mate is characterized by a multidimensional
vector of observable characteristics, the matching is one-dimensional, as men and women as-
sess each other through an index combining these various attributes, of which we model the
trade-o⁄s. This is in sharp contrast with Galichon and SalaniØ (2009), where matching is
1explicitly multidimensional, and in line with Gunter et al. (2009) on online dating, where
they model individual utility as a simple linear valuation of the mate￿ s attributes.
Marriage is modeled as the outcome of a frictionless matching process; utilities are assumed
transferable, so that the impact of the matching process on individual utilities and intra-
household transfers can readily be assessed. Men are homogeneous in their preferences for
women, and women are homogeneous in their preferences for men, so that we assume that
each mate ranks all potential partners in the same way. However, men and women di⁄er
on their endowment of the physical and socioeconomic characteristics. Marital surplus is
multiplicative in these one-dimensional indices summarizing a mate￿ s quality in the market, so
that the equilibrium generates assortative mating. Finally, households are able to commit, at
least partially, on the division of resources during marriage. It follows that the socioeconomic
environment and individual characteristics at the time of marriage have potentially lasting
e⁄ects on intra-household allocation.
One of the main contributions of our study is to consider multidimensional characteristics,
and the corresponding marriage market trade-o⁄s between physical and socioeconomic char-
acteristics. In fact, almost all matching models are one dimensional, analyzing the sorting
patterns and assortative mating by one attribute at a time, such as income or education (e.g.
Becker, 1991, Pencavel, 1998, with the exception of Galichon and SalaniØ, 2009), and hardly
considering physical attractiveness in marital sorting (Chow and Siow, 2006; Wong, 2003,
Flinn and Del Boca, 2007 do not use measures of physical attributes in their analysis, and
Becker, Pencavel either). One exception is the literature on online dating. Recently, Gunter
et. al. (2009) use detailed information on weight, height, facial looks, and income, but they
lack the relevant information on the matches actually formed. Moreover, the psychology lit-
erature at most analyzes the existence of an exchange between physical and socioeconomic
attributes emphasizing trade-o⁄s between mates (e.g. Stevens et al., 1990), whereas we also
take into account ￿exchanges￿across characteristics of the same mate.
2Our model predicts that thinner (￿richer￿ ) men and women match with thinner (￿richer￿ )
mates, everything else being equal in terms of other attributes. Compensation between your
own qualities and defects is possible in equilibrium, provided you possess the characteristics
that are considered substitutes in your mate￿ s assessment. We assume that the ability wives
care about is well proxied by their husbands￿wage and earnings, whereas the ability husbands
care about is well proxied by their wives￿potential wages, so that we allow for men and
women to di⁄er on which socioeconomic dimensions they consider as substitutes for physical
attractiveness, and on the magnitudes of this substitutability. Additionally, we predict the
constancy of these trade-o⁄s for each mate across the relevant characteristics of the other
mate.
Our main ￿ndings are that female BMI and potential wages matter for men, and male
BMI, height and wage (or actual earnings) matter for women. Speci￿cally, men prefer thinner
women and women with higher potential wages. Women prefer taller men, thinner men and
men with higher wages (earnings).
We are not aware of any previous study exploring the role of marriage market forces
with respect to both anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics. The importance of
our novel approach is twofold: ￿rst, we explore a potential mechanism between BMI and
earnings that has not yet been analyzed, modeling the role of marriage market penalties of
anthropometric characteristics; second, we analyze an additional aspect of the actual marriage
market impact that body size have on individuals, focusing on the extent to which (potential)
wages and earnings can provide individuals with means of compensating their higher BMI.
We investigate whether this compensation exists, estimate its magnitude and assess whether
it varies by gender.
Spouses tend to share a variety of characteristics, including age, education, race, religion,
and anthropometric characteristics such as height and weight (Gunter et al., 2009; Becker,
1991; Weiss and Willis, 1997; Qian, 1998; Silventoinen et al., 2003). Assortative mating
3in body weights has been established in the medical and psychological literatures, which
document signi￿cant and positive interspousal correlations for weight (Schafer and Keith,
1990; Allison et al., 1996; Speakman et al., 2007), and the importance of examining the e⁄ect
of both spouses￿characteristics on their marriage (Fu and Goldman, 2000; Je⁄rey and Rick,
2002; McNulty and Ne⁄, 2008).
A large body of literature using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data links women￿ s
weight to lower spousal earnings or lower likelihood of being in a relationship (Averett and
Korenman, 1996; Averett et al., 2008; Mukhopadhyay, 2008; Tosini, 2009). However, these
data provide anthropometric measures of the respondent only, so that the weight-income
trade-o⁄ across spouses is estimated without controlling for the men￿ s physical attributes.
The same can be said about the in￿ uential work by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), which
shows that physically unattractive women are matched with less educated husbands, and
about studies considering height as a determinant of marriage rates. For instance, Herpin
(2005) shows that the probability of being in a relationship is lower for shorter men.
Recently, Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque (2009) use PSID data on anthropometric and
socioeconomic characteristics of both spouses, and ￿nd that female physical attractiveness
plays a larger role in the marriage market than does men￿ s, with the result that heavier women
are thrice penalized, with husbands of lower socioeconomic and physical status (poorer, less
educated, and shorter). Heavier husbands pay a marriage-market penalty only in terms of the
lower educational level attained by their wives. Shorter women tend to marry men with lower
socioeconomic status (less educated or poorer). Shorter husbands, on the other hand, are
penalized on both the physical and socioeconomic dimensions, in that their wives are heavier
and less educated. Their ￿nding suggest that men and women may di⁄er in their evaluation
of mates￿anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics, men putting more weight on
female body and less on female actual economic resources and women putting more weight on
male ability to generate income and less on their physical appeal. In addition to this sorting
4penalty, there could be a compensation mechanism across own individual characteristics, so
that a defect is compensated with a quality. Everything else being equal, if an individual has
a higher BMI, he/she may work and earn more to compensate for the poor physical attribute
and still match with a socially desirable spouse. These trade-o⁄s among own attributes may
di⁄er by gender, as the corresponding compensating schemes could occur across di⁄erent
dimensions for men and women.
In this paper, we estimate marital trade-o⁄s in the US and several European countries.
For the US, we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which contains
anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics on married men and women from 1999 to
2005. For Europe, we use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which contains
similar information on married men and women from 1998 to 2001 for 9 European countries.
We ￿nd evidence of compensation between anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics.
In the US, an additional unit of husband￿ s (wife￿ s) BMI can be compensated by a 0.3%-increase
(0.15%-increase) in husband￿ s (wife￿ s) average (predicted) wage. Interestingly, these ￿ndings
suggest that female physical attractiveness plays a larger role in men￿ s assessment of a woman
than male physical attractiveness does for women
Our ￿ndings are in line with research in psychology and economics linking body size,
obesity, attractiveness, and the desirability of a potential mate. For instance, Braun and Bryan
(2006) found that men di⁄ered from women in the greater extent to which they reported that
physical features, including face, body shape, and weight, were important in their assessments
of the desirability of a potential mate. Conversely, women gave much greater consideration
than did men to personality, intelligence, and career choice. Recently, using data from the
PSID, Gregory and Rhum (2009) suggest that BMI may serve as a proxy for socially-de￿ned
physical attractiveness. Indeed, Rooth (2009) found that photos that were manipulated to
make a person of normal weight appear to be obese caused a change in the viewer￿ s perception,
from attractive to unattractive.
5Our results can also be contextualized in the economic research agenda on the e⁄ects
of anthropometric measures. Many economists have been working on assessing the e⁄ects
of height, weight and BMI on labor-market outcomes. The consensus is that BMI in the
overweight or obese range has negative e⁄ects on the probability of employment and on hourly
wages, particularly for women (Han, Norton, and Stearns, 2009), while height has a positive
e⁄ect on hourly wages, perhaps re￿ ecting the fact that taller people are more likely to have
reached their full cognitive potential (Case and Paxson, 2008) and/or may possess superior
physical capacities (Lundborg, Nystedt, Rooth, 2009). On top of these labor-market e⁄ects,
not to mention the well-known negative health e⁄ects of being overweight, we provide an
equilibrium analysis of how the marriage market values these anthropometric characteristics
relatively to socioeconomic characteristics, providing also empirical evidence of the additional
consequences that BMI and height may have for individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a marriage market model of attrac-
tiveness and provides the equilibrium analysis. Section 3 discusses how to measure attrac-
tiveness that mates care about. Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical analysis.
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The basic framework
We consider a continuous population of men and a continuous population of women of equal
mass, which we normalize to one. Each potential husband, say i 2 I, is characterized by
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6Our model involves frictionless matching under transferable utility a la Becker-Shapley-




that can be freely shared between them. Our key assumption is the following:
Assumption I (Index Assumption) There exists two functions F from RK to R and G

























In words, the ￿ attractiveness￿of male i (resp. female j) on the marriage market is fully




















In particular, the surplus generated by the match of i and j only depends on the two in-
dices Ii and Jj. This implies that although each agent is characterized by a multidimensional
vector of observables (plus one unobservable shock), the matching is one-dimensional: indi-
vidual characteristics only matter through some factors F and G that have to be estimated.
This is in sharp contrast with Galichon and SalaniØ (2009), in which matching is explicitly
multidimensional.
Another important implication of this assumption is that one can easily model the trade-o⁄
between various characteristics. Indeed, attractivity is fully summarized by the indices I and
J, which are moreover the sum of a deterministic function of the variables and a random shock
representing unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we can de￿ne ￿ iso-attractive￿pro￿les, i.e.
pro￿les of observable characteristics that generate the same (distribution of) attractiveness.
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(and a similar de￿nition can be given for women).
The key remark, here, is that these MRSs do not depend on the realization of the heterogeneity
shock "; they are identical for all individuals with identical pro￿le of observables.
2.2 Stable match
The existence of a stable match follows from standard results. For some results, we will need
an additional assumption, that is common in the matching literature:
Assumption SM (Super Modularity): The surplus function S is supermodular: if f >
f0and g > g0 then
S (f;g) + S (f
0;g
0) > S (f;g
0) + S (f
0;g)
As it is well known, Assumption SM implies that the stable match is unique and strictly
assortative; i.e., if male i is matched with female j and male i0 is matched with female j0 then
the male with higher index must be matched with the female with higher index (i.e., i > i0
implies that j > j0 and conversely).
2.3 Testability and identi￿cation
We now address the identi￿cation issue. Assume that we observe the marital patterns in
the population under consideration; i.e., we observe the joint density of observables among
married couples. To what extend is it possible to recover the underlying, attractiveness
indices? In particular, can one quantify the trade-o⁄ described before? The answer is given
by the following result.
8Proposition 1 Assume that Assumption I is satis￿ed. Then the joint distribution of marital
characteristics across couples only depends on the factors F (X) and G(Y ). Moreover, the
factors are identi￿ed from the joint distribution up to a transform; in particular, the marginal
rates of substitution are exactly identi￿ed. Finally, testable restrictions are generated.
Proof. Note, ￿rst, that any two agents with similar indices are equivalent for matching
purposes. Since the distribution of " and ￿ is independent of the observables, the value of
F (X) (resp. G(Y )) is a su¢ cient statistic for the distribution of I (J). Next, note that the
expected value of the kth characteristic of the wife, conditional on the vector of characteristics
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First, they are exactly identi￿ed. Second, the left hand side of the expression above does not
depend on l, so neither should the right hand side, which generates overidentifying restrictions.
In other words, the trade-o⁄s discussed above can readily be recovered from matching
patterns. One can, for instance, (non parametrically) regress a female characteristic over
the set of male characteristic for married couples. The ratio of the e⁄ects of any two male
characteristics is the MRS; moreover, this ratio should not depend on the particular female
characteristic considered, which generates overidentifying restrictions.
93 Measuring Attractiveness
In our model, individual attractiveness is fully summarized by a one-dimensional index that is
a function of a multidimensional vector of anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics.
Anthropometric characteristics (height and BMI) are measures of physical attractiveness (i.e.,
beauty), while socioeconomic characteristics (wages, potential wages and earnings) are mea-
sures of socioeconomic attractiveness (i.e., ability/productivity in the labor market or in the
household). We allow for di⁄erent sets of anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics
to matter in men￿ s and women￿ s valuation of their mates￿attractiveness.
3.1 Physical Attractiveness: BMI and Height
One of the main contributions of our paper is to model mates￿preferences over both socioeco-
nomic and anthropometric characteristics, and to empirical analyze this information on both
spouses. Speci￿cally, we consider BMI as a measure of both male and female physical attrac-
tiveness, whereas height is only a measure of male physical attractiveness. In this section,
we address the validity of our main measure of physical attractiveness, namely, BMI. The
validity of height as a measure of male physical attractiveness, but not of female physical
attractiveness, has been extensively discussed in the literature (see Herpin (2005) for detailed
references).
Both body shape and body size are important determinants of physical attractiveness.
While BMI provides information on body size, the waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) and the waist-
to-chest ratio (WCR) provide information on body shape. The available empirical evidence
indicates that weight scaled for height (BMI) is a far more important factor than WHR of
female physical attractiveness (ToveØ, Reinhardt, Emery and Cornelissen, 1998; ToveØ et al.,
1999). The literature review on body shape, body size and physical attractiveness by Swami
(2008) seems to point to BMI being the dominant cue for female physical attractiveness, with
WHR (the ratio of the width of the waist to the width of the hips) playing a more minor
10role. However, for male physical attractiveness WCR (waist-to-chest) plays a more important
role than either the WHR or BMI, although it must be emphasized that BMI and WHR are
strongly positively correlated. Indeed, BMI is correlated with the male attractiveness rating
by women, though this correlation is lower than the one with WCR.
Ideally we would like to have information on BMI for women and WCR for men. However,
it should be noted that we are not aware of any study with detailed measures of body shape
and socioeconomic characteristics which are also simultaneously available for both spouses.
Moreover, despite that the review by Swami (2008) suggests that WCR is a better proxy for
male attractiveness than BMI, BMI can still be considered a good proxy for male physical
attractiveness. Wells, Treleaven and Cole (2007) using a large survey of adults in the UK
(more than 4,000 men and more than 5,000 women) and a sophisticated technique to assess
body shape (three-dimensional body scanning), investigated the relationship of shape and
BMI. They found that BMI conveys di⁄erent information about men and women: the two
main factors associated with weight in men after adjustment for height are chest and waist,
whereas in women they are hip and bust. They suggested that chest in men but hips in women
re￿ ect physique (the form or structure of a person￿ s body, i.e., physical appearance), whereas
waist in men and bust in women re￿ ects fatness. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that BMI
is a good proxy for male physical attractiveness. Thus, in our empirical analysis, we will use
BMI as our measure of physical attractiveness, for both men and women, consistent also with
Gregory and Ruhm (2009), who suggest that BMI may serve as a proxy for socially-de￿ned
physical attractiveness.
3.2 Socioeconomic Attractiveness: Wages, Predicted Wages and
Earnings
In our model, men and women observe potential mates￿ability in the labor market and in
the household, such as ability to generate income, disutility from work, earnings capacity and
11household productivity. However, the econometrician does not observe these abilities (pre-
determined with respect to marriage), but socioeconomic characteristics (outcomes). Male
socioeconomic characteristics are thought to directly re￿ ect labor market ability (produc-
tivity), while female socioeconomic characteristics are thought to capture housework ability
(productivity) and perhaps a general attitude toward market work. Women may actually
value ability to generate income in men, while men may put less emphasis on this quality
in a woman, and instead appreciate a more general ability in terms of household production
and just potential ability to generate earnings. It could also be the case that there is more
heterogeneity in the ability to work hard in the male population rather than in the female, so
that there is not enough variation in the women￿ s population to be captured as a dimension
of the index. In general, all potential husbands participate in the labor market, so working
is not a signal of ability per se in women￿ s assessment of a man. Conversely, for women
participation in the labor market may signal their ability.
For men, wages and earnings are good proxies for the ability that women care about in
a man, i.e. labor market productivity. Wages and earnings are strongly related to ability.
Moreover, earnings are also likely to capture disutility from work.
For women, potential wage is a good proxy for the ability that men care about in a
woman, i.e. ability to generate quality household public goods and potential ability to work
in the market. We measure potential wage as the predicted wage for all wives (working
and non-working) from a wage equation estimated for married women who are working.
The speci￿cation we use to predict potential wage uses age (in categories), education (in
categories), number of children, health status, age interacted with number of children and
state ￿xed e⁄ects. Although these characteristics are observed during marriage, we claim
that individuals and their potential spouses are able to anticipate them, so they use such
information to make the prediction.
Therefore, we can investigate the relative importance in the marriage market of anthro-
12pometric and socioeconomic characteristics and the extent to which men and women di⁄er in
their assessments. Speci￿cally, we can analyze whether marriage market forces allow individ-
uals to sort along both types of characteristics, and, most importantly, whether the marriage
market allows individuals to compensate their defects with their qualities. In other words, if
physical attractiveness (beauty) and socioeconomic attractiveness (ability) are the character-
istics entering the index with which men and women assess potential mates, then, according
to our model, we should observe the following patterns:
(1) Beautiful (or able) husbands marry beautiful (or able) wives, ceteris paribus.
(2) Ugly (or unable) husbands who marry beautiful (or able) wives are more able (or
more beautiful), ceteris paribus.
These sorting and compensation mechanisms can then be tested by running a regression
of a female (male) characteristic over the set of the spouse characteristics to estimate the
marginal rate of substitution among the characteristics of the spouse. Moreover, this ratio
should not depend on the particular female (male) characteristic considered, so that we can
additionally test for the equality of these rates of substitution across di⁄erent female (male)
characteristics.
4 Data description
Estimation is carried out on the basis of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) for the US and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for 9 European
Countries.
4.1 The PSID
The PSID is a longitudinal household survey collecting a wide range of individual and house-
hold demographic, income, and labor-market variables. In addition, in all the most recent
13waves since 1999 (1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005), the PSID provides the weights (in pounds) and
heights (in inches) of both household heads and wives, which we use to calculate the BMI of
each spouse, de￿ned as an individual￿ s body weight (in kilograms) divided by the square of
his or her height (in meters squared).1
In each of the survey years under consideration, the PSID comprises about 4,500 married
households. We select households with a household head and a wife where both are actually
present. In our sample years, all the married heads with spouse present are males, so we
refer to each couple as husband and wife, respectively. We con￿ne our study to those couples
whose wife is between 25 and 40 years old, because for this group body size (BMI, height)
as a proxy for physical attractiveness should be more relevant in explaining socio-economic
outcomes. Our analysis comprises white husbands and wives, because blacks are dispro-
portionately overrepresented in low-income households (￿poverty/SEO sample￿ ). Following
Conley and Glauber (2007), we discard those couples whose height and weight values include
any extreme ones: a weight of more than 400 or less than 70 pounds, a height above 84 or
below 45 inches. Our sample thus consists of 5,807 observations, a sample size consistent with
those of previous studies using PSID data to analyze obesity and the labor market (Cawley,
Grabka, Lillard, 2005; Conley and Glauber, 2007; Kano, 2008).
We rely on the longitudinal structure of the PSID to account for how recently a couple got
married. This demographic group is worth analyzing because the marriage-market penalties
for BMI should arise through sorting at the time of the match and thus be more visible for
recently married couples rather than for our entire sample.
In the PSID all the variables, including the information on the wife, are reported by the
head of the household. Although it is well-known that self-reported anthropometric measures
are likely to su⁄er from measurement error, the error seems to be constant for the 25-55
age group according to the analyses in Thomas and Frankenberg (2000) and in Ezzati et
1The pounds/inches BMI formula is: Weight (in pounds) x 704.5 divided by Height (in inches) x Height
(in inches).
14al. (2006) with US data. Cawley (2000, 2004) used the National Health and Nutrition Ex-
amination Survey III (NHANES III) to estimate the relationship between measured height
and weight and their self-reported counterparts. First, he estimated regressions of the corre-
sponding measured variable to its self-reported counterpart by age and race. Then, assuming
transportability, he used the NHANES III estimated coe¢ cients to adjust the self-reported
variables from the NLSY. The results for the e⁄ect of BMI on wages were very similar, whether
corrected for measurement error or not. Hence, we rely on his ￿ndings, and we are con￿dent
that our results (based on unadjusted data) are unlikely to be signi￿cantly biased.2
4.2 The ECHP
The European Community Household Panel, Eurostat, is a survey based on a standardized
questionnaire that involves annual interviewing of a representative panel of households and
individuals in member states of the European Union during 1994￿ 2001. We use the ECHP
users￿database (UDB).3
The ECHP covers a wide range of topics on living conditions, and its standardized method-
ology and procedures yield comparable information across countries. As in the PSID, anthro-
pometric data are self-reported in the EHCP. Our analysis is focused on 9 European countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. France,
Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and United Kingdom have no available anthropo-
metric information in the ECHP. Moreover, Sweden is excluded from our analysis because it
does not have a full ECHP data format in any of the waves.4
We estimate di⁄erent models for each country, allowing for a purely ￿ exible econometric
2It is not clear that the method used in Cawley (2000, 2004) can be applied in our context. While in
the NHANES III and NLSY each individual only self-reports his/her own weight/height, in the PSID the
household head is reporting his own and his wife￿ s height and weight. However, Cawley et al. (2005) use the
procedure using data from the PSID without discussing such an issue.
3Organizations can purchase a version of this users￿ database under strict contractual conditions,
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/echpanel/info/data/information.html.
4Peracchi (2002) and the Europanel Users Network (http://epunet.essex.ac.uk) provide more detailed in-
formation on the ECHP.
15speci￿cation, in the sense that none of the coe¢ cients are restricted to be the same across
countries. In other words, we estimate the sorting and compensation in di⁄erent European
countries. This can reveal interesting patterns in the sorting and the trade-o⁄s between
anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics across di⁄erent countries (cultures).
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 A linear speci￿cation of the model
We now further specify the model by assuming speci￿c functional forms. We take a linear
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i capture unobserved heterogeneity that we allow to be correlated across k, and
similarly for ￿l
j. Hence, we can estimate (1) simultaneously for all characteristics l using
Seemingly-Unrelated-Regression (SUR) and the same with (2). Then, we obtain the marginal





























j ) do not vary across characteristics l (k).
5.2 Main Results
Table 2 shows the estimated coe¢ cients of the characteristics that constitute the male￿ s
index with which women evaluate men￿ s attractiveness, highlighting the existence of both
sorting and compensation across anthropometric and socioeconomic characteristics of men
and women. Speci￿cally, the estimates show that men are willing and able to substitute
their defects (e.g., having a higher BMI) with their qualities (e.g., having a higher log wage,
being taller), and women are willing to accept this compensation across male characteristics
(i.e, women see these characteristics as actual substitutes). Concerning assortative mating,
column (1) shows that there is positive sorting in body size: wife￿ s BMI is positively associated
with husband￿ s BMI, which is consistent with previous studies in the medical literature (e.g.,
Allison et al., 1996; Speakman et al., 2007) and in economics (e.g., Gunter et al., 2009; Ore¢ ce
and Quintana-Domeque, 2009). Furthermore, column (2) provides evidence of assortative
mating in socioeconomic characteristics: wife￿ s log (predicted wage) is positively associated
with husband￿ s log (wage), consistent with previous studies (e.g., Lam, 1988; Wong, 2003).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows the estimated marginal rates of substitution between
husband￿ s BMI and his log(wage), husband￿ s height and his log (wage) and husband￿ s height
and his BMI. As predicted by our model, we cannot reject that the ratios are equal no matter
17which characteristic of the wife￿ s index is considered. For example, given the wife￿ s BMI, the
ratio of the coe¢ cients of the husband￿ s BMI and log(wage) is -0.278, which indicates that
men can actually compensate their higher BMI with a higher log(wage): an additional unit
of husband￿ s BMI (roughly an increase in weight of 3.2 kg for the average husband) can be
compensated by a 0.3%-increase in husband￿ s average wage. In other words, a 10kg-increase
in weight for the average husband can be compensated by a 1%-increase in husband￿ s average
wage.
In Table 3 we report the same set of coe¢ cients as in Table 2, the di⁄erence being that
the coe¢ cients correspond to the characteristics that constitute the female￿ s index with which
men assess women￿ s attractiveness. As above, we observe positive sorting in body size and
socioeconomic characteristics. We also observe a similar pattern of substitutability between
female qualities and defects. There is evidence of compensation of a higher female￿ s BMI
with a higher female￿ s log predicted wage across husbands characteristics, namely, husband￿ s
BMI, height and log (wage). Furthermore, the marginal rates of substitution between wife￿ s
BMI and her log (predicted wage) are constant across husbands characteristics, as predicted
by our model. An additional unit of wife￿ s BMI can be compensated by a 0.15%-increase in
wife￿ s average (predicted) wage.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Interestingly, the MRS between husband￿ s BMI and husband￿ s log(wage) is twice as high
(in absolute value) than the MRS between wife￿ s BMI and wife￿ s log(predicted wage), sug-
gesting that female physical attractiveness plays a larger role in men￿ s assessment of a woman
than male physical attractiveness does for women.
Similar results are found in tables 4 and 5, where we replace husband￿ s log (wage) with
husband￿ s log (earnings).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
[Insert Table 5 about here]
18Overall, our ￿ndings show the following patterns:
(1) Beautiful (or able) husbands marry beautiful (or able) wives, ceteris paribus.
(2) Ugly (or unable) husbands who marry beautiful (or able) wives are more able (or
more beautiful), ceteris paribus.
This results show that preferences are one important cause of marital sorting, which
can arise without search frictions. Moreover, the di⁄erent MRS between men and women,
suggest that they di⁄er in their assessments of mates￿physical attractiveness. However, these
di⁄erences may be due to the higher degree of heterogeneity in male income than in the female
income distribution.
5.3 Additional Results
The evidence presented so far points to a marriage market trade-o⁄ between BMI and actual
earnings of husbands, which is absent for wives. We further explore the ability of married men
to compensate their BMI by earning higher labor income, and the absence of this e⁄ect of
wife￿ s BMI on their disposable income. We focus on working couples, where wives as well are
working, because we want to analyze compensation e⁄ects for body size in terms of earnings
of both husbands and wives. Moreover, couples where the wife is also working should be the
ones in which women would actually have the means to provide a compensation for their high
BMI in terms of disposable income.
Table 6 presents regressions where the dependent variable is earnings, separately by gender
and marital status, controlling for BMI and socioeconomic characteristics of the individual
(and the spouse), such as age, completed education, number of children in the household,
health status, household non-labor income, and state ￿xed e⁄ects. Interestingly, column
(1) shows that the BMI of married men exhibits a positive signi￿cant correlation with their
earnings, whereas column (2) shows that for unmarried men the relationship between BMI
and earnings is not statistically signi￿cant. Men seem responsive to their BMI and willing to
19alter their labor supply behavior increasing their earnings only within marriage. There could
be a compensation mechanism across own individual characteristics. Everything else being
equal, if a male individual is heavier (has a higher BMI), he may work more hours and earn
more to compensate for the poor physical characteristic and still match with a decent spouse.
It seems that heavier husbands with higher labor supply can match to wives comparable to
those of thinner husbands, ceteris paribus. Evidence on labor supply (available upon request)
seems to con￿rm this interpretation.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
This signi￿cant correlation for husbands is remarkable, inasmuch married men￿ s labor
supply and earnings generally exhibit a low elasticity. Consistent with our previous ￿ndings,
there is also a negative signi￿cant relationship between the wife￿ s BMI and the husband￿ s
labor income
Columns (3) and (4) show the earnings regressions for women by marital status. If we
compare the female estimates to those for men, the most striking ￿nding is that now BMI
is not related to earnings. This evidence would reinforce our interpretation of the index
estimates, suggesting that male￿ s preferences for thin women are much stronger than those
of women for thin men. It does not seem to be the case that the absence of compensation
for women is due to labor market constraints, as wives￿labor supplies do not exhibit any
signi￿cant correlation with their BMIs either and their actual wages do not exhibit a negative
signi￿cant correlation with BMI (available upon request). The returns to education (in terms
of earnings) are very similar for both married and unmarried women.
Overall, our ￿ndings support our approach of the potentially new channel through which
BMI a⁄ects income, speci￿cally for men. We show that heavier husbands earn more income
than thinner ones, to compensate their spouse for their poor physical characteristic. No
such positive relationship is found for unmarried individuals or for wives. This evidence may
contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between BMI and income, which
20has been extensively analyzed in the literature for both men and women, without reaching a
consensus on the actual e⁄ects for men (for women a negative relationship is found in most
studies). Some studies have found a positive association between income (earnings) and BMI
for men (e.g. Garcia Villar and Quintana-Domeque, 2009), and this may be explained by the
interaction e⁄ects of BMI and marital status on earnings, through an increase in labor supply
due to a compensation mechanism.
Do these compensations really matter in a couple? We try to address this question by
looking at whether in the absence of earnings compensation, higher BMI leads to higher
probability of divorce in recently married couples (less than 5 years of marriage). Table 7
shows that an increase in husband￿ s weight between 2005 and 2007 is associated with a higher
probability of marital dissolution between 2005 and 2007, ceteris paribus. At the same time,
an increase in husband￿ s earnings is associated with a lower probability of divorce. An increase
in husband￿ s weight of 10 kilograms translates into an increase of 2% in the probability of
divorce, while an increase in husband￿ s earnings of 2% translates into a decrease of 7% in the
probability of divorce.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Since height does not change, a change in BMI translates into a proportional change in
weight. Hence, the results in Table 7 show that couples where husbands increase their BMI
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics. PSID 2005. 
Means  
(SD)    Married  Unmarried 
    Husbands  Wives  Males  Females 
 Hours of work 
(annual) 









 Earnings (annual) 





























































































A. Coefficients of the Male’s Index 
Husband’s log (wage)  -0.661***  0.094*** 
(0.181) (0.017) 
Husband’s height  -0.082**  0.017*** 
(0.041) (0.004) 
Husband’s BMI  0.183***  -0.011** 
(0.048) (0.005) 
Husband’s Age  0.004  0.004* 
(0.021) (0.002) 
Number of children  0.218**  -0.355*** 
(0.108) (0.010) 
Sample size  507 
Correlation of residuals  -0.057 (BP Test Chi
2(1) = 1.67) 
B. MRS = ratios of coefficients
__Husband’s BMI__  -0.277*** 
(0.107) 
-0.121** 
(0.053)  Husband’s log (wage) 
Test of equality Chi
2(1) = 1.76 
__Husband’s height__  0.125* 
(0.075) 
0.181** 
(0.056)  Husband’s log (wage) 
Test of equality Chi
2(1) = 0.39 
Husband’s height  -0.450* 
(0.253) 
-0.149** 
(0.677)  Husband’s BMI 
Test of equality Chi
2(1) = 0.14 
Note: All regressions include state fixed effects. Observations have been weighed 
using the PSID family weights.  






Table 3: Regressions of husband’s characteristics on wife’s characteristics.  
SUR Estimates. 







A. Coefficients of the Female’s Index
Wife’s log (predicted wage)  -0.913**  2.38***  0.588*** 
(0.414) (0.49)  (0.107) 
Wife’s BMI   0.141***  -0.089*  -0.035*** 
(0.040) (0.046)  (0.011) 
Wife’s Age  0.015  -0.050  0.017** 
(0.026) (0.031)  (0.007) 
Number of children  -0.325*  0.713***  0.182*** 
(0.180) (0.212)  (0.047) 
Sample size  507 
Corr. of residuals (1) and (2)  0.031 
Corr. of residuals (1) and (3)  0.015 
Corr. of residuals (2) and (3)  0.085 
BP Test Chi
2(3) = 4.29 
B. MRS = ratios of coefficients 
______Wife’s BMI______ -0.154*  -0.037*  -0.060* 
Wife’s log (predicted wage)  (0.087)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Test of equality ratios (1) and (2)  Chi
2(1) = 1.68 
Test of equality ratios (1) and (3)  Chi
2(1) = 0.61 
Test of equality ratios (2) and (3)  Chi
2(1) = 0.30 
Note: All regressions include state fixed effects. Observations have been weighed using the PSID 
family weights. 














A. Coefficients of the Male’s Index 
Husband’s log (earnings)  -0.203  0.047*** 
(0.131) (0.012) 
Husband’s height  -0.094**  0.018*** 
(0.041) (0.004) 
Husband’s BMI  0.192***  -0.013** 
(0.049) (0.005) 
Husband’s Age  0.001  0.004* 
(0.022) (0.002) 
Number of children  0.235**  -0.358*** 
(0.109) (0.010) 
Sample size  507 
Correlation of residuals  -0.083** (BP Test Chi
2(1) = 3.50) 
B. MRS = ratios of coefficients
__Husband’s BMI__  -0.946 
(0.648) 
-0.278** 
(0.118)  Husband’s log (earnings) 
Test of equality Chi
2(1) = 1.07 
__Husband’s height__  0.466 
(0.388) 
0.378*** 
(0.138)  Husband’s log (earnings) 
Test of equality Chi
2(1) = 0.05 
Husband’s height  -0.491** 
(0.250) 
-1.37** 
(0.566)  Husband’s BMI 
Test of equality Chi
2(1) = 2.13 
Note: All regressions include state fixed effects. Observations have been weighed 
using the PSID family weights.  






Table 5: Regressions of husband’s characteristics on wife’s characteristics.  
SUR Estimates. 







A. Coefficients of the Female’s Index
Wife’s log (predicted wage)  -0.913**  2.39***  0.599*** 
(0.414) (0.487)  (0.155) 
Wife’s BMI   0.141***  -0.089*  -0.019*** 
(0.039) (0.046)  (0.015) 
Wife’s Age  0.015  -0.050  0.025** 
(0.026) (0.031)  (0.010) 
Number of children  -0.325*  0.713***  0.206*** 
(0.180) (0.212)  (0.067) 
Sample size  507 
Corr. of residuals (1) and (2)  0.031 
Corr. of residuals (1) and (3)  0.071 
Corr. of residuals (2) and (3)  0.114 
BP Test Chi
2(3) = 9.59** 
B. MRS = ratios of coefficients 
______Wife’s BMI______ -0.154*  -0.037*  -0.031 
Wife’s log (predicted wage)  (0.087)  (0.022)  (0.027) 
Test of equality ratios (1) and (2)  Chi2(1) = 1.68 
Test of equality ratios (1) and (3)  Chi2(1) = 0.04 
Test of equality ratios (2) and (3)  Chi2(1) = 1.78 
Note: All regressions include state fixed effects. Observations have been weighed using the PSID 
family weights. 







Table 6: Regressions of log (earnings). 
    Men  Women 
















































































































R2  0.29 0.26 0.30 0.37 
N  670 471 670 651 
Note: Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. All 
regressions include state fixed effects and occupational dummies for both spouses. 
Family weights are used.  







Table 7: Regressions of change in marital status between 2005 and 2007 for 
married individuals in 2005 (both spouses working)  




≤ 5 years in 
2005 
Duration of  
marriage  
> 5 years in 
 2005 
∆ Husband’s log (earnings)  -0.035**  -0.005 
(0.017) (0.004) 
∆ Husband’s weight  0.002*  -0.000 
(0.041) (0.004) 
∆ Wife’s log (earnings)  0.003  -0.008 
(0.008) (0.010) 
∆ Wife’s weight  -0.000  0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Sample size  139  602 
Note: All regressions include the change in the number of children. Observations 
have been weighed using the PSID family weights.  
*** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 
 